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SHUTTING
UP SHOP
The closed 
shop is a 
prime target 
in Jeff 
Kennett and 
John 
Hewson’s 
industrial 
revolution. 
They see it as 
a cornerstone 
of union 
power. But, 
as Gianni 
Zappala re­
ports, the 
evidence is 
far from be­
ing clear-cut. 
Maybe un­
ions should 
give the 
closed shop 
away.
T
he closed shop has long been one of 
the principal tenets and organising 
strategies of unions. Some of the bit­
ter industrial struggles fought in Aus 
tralia at the turn of the century—disputes that 
led to the system of compulsory arbitration— 
were over the issue of compulsory unionism. As 
the industrial relations debate now focuses on 
enterprise bargaining, workplace practices such 
as the closed shop are again underthe spotlight. 
The federal opposition’s spokesperson on in­
dustrial relations, John Howard, has promised 
to outlaw the closed shop if the Coalition wins 
the next election. In any case, in the two most 
populous states, NSW and Victoria, the closed 
shop has already been effectively banned by the 
banning of preference to unionists clauses in 
awards. So whether unions like it or not, the 
issue is bound to stay on the public agenda.
Yet while the closed shop has come to be 
seen as an unquestioned tenet of unionism, 
little is known about its impact on unions 
themselves. The case for supporting the closed 
shop from a union perspective is far from con­
clusive and needs to be demonstrated. The 
argument that the closed shop enabled unions 
to organise workers in seasonal and erratic jobs 
at the turn of the century may not be relevant 
to workers in the service sector in the 1990s. Is 
the closed shop appropriate to a union move­
ment intending to adopt a greater focus on the 
provision of services, the targeting of special 
groups, and the portraying of unions as a valu­
able ‘club’ to be a member of?
Not only is the closed shop coming under 
attack at the legislative level in both state and 
federal spheres, but many union members them­
selves are opposed to the idea of the closed shop. 
One estimate suggests that at least 25% of all 
unionists were unwilling conscripts in 1990. 
That is, one quarter of all unionists would
probably not have joined their trade unions if it 
were not for closed shops. Moreover, 82% of all 
union members favoured voluntary union mem­
bership. What will happen to union member­
ship and density if compulsory unionism is 
tanned federally as well as at state level? Here I 
want to question the implicit acceptance of the 
closed shop by unions. This is meant as a stimu­
lus for debate on possible future organising 
strategies for the labour movement. In particu­
lar, I want to focus on four (contrasting) propo­
sitions concerning the impact of the closed shop 
on unions.
1. Do closed shops reduce union militancy 
and activity?
First, it is sometimes argued that if all em­
ployees are forced to join the union, the apa­
thetic members may tend to ‘dilute’ the mili­
tants within the union. That is, are unwilling 
conscripts more apathetic and conservative than 
volunteers?This argument rests on the assump­
tion, popular among European unions, that a 
union’s strength lies not in numbers but in the 
percentage of strongly-committed members. 
Second, this prompts the question: are central 
union organisations less militant undercompul- 
sory union membership? Given that the influ­
ence of unions on policy matters within the 
central organisations tends to depend on their 
size, and traditionally non-militant unions gain 
relatively more members through closed shops 
than do mili t ant unions, it may be expected that 
compulsory unionism also leads to less militant 
central union bodies. Third, it is often argued 
from the contrary perspective that the closed 
shop encourages ‘responsible’ unionism. By en­
suring organisational survival, the closed shop 
allows union organisers to take a longer term 
view of industrial relations, and not engage as 
frequently in industrial action in order to dem­
onstrate their effectiveness to potential mem-
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bers. Fourth, employers often use the closed shop to 
strike agreements with less militant unions in order 
to keep more militant rivals at bay. This was one of 
the reasons it was thought management became 
enamoured of the closed shop in the late 1960s and 
1970s.
Australian research has suggested that there are 
significant attitudinal differences among union mem­
bers who have joined their union voluntarily and 
those who have been compelled to join because of 
closed shop arrangements. Those who have been 
compelled to join (conscripts) have been found to 
be more conservative in their political outlook and 
less inclined to support union policies. Voluntary 
union members were likely in the more ‘aggressive’ 
unions and were inclined to prefer an increase in 
the level of their union’s activity. In contrast, the 
conscripts belonged to less aggressive unions and 
tended to be satisfied with their present level of 
activity and militancy. The evidence from these 
studies would support the view that the impact of 
militant members may be diluted due to the entry of 
unwilling unionists.
A recent (albeit tentative) source of evidence 
comes from Industrial Relations at Work: Australian
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AGPS, 1991). 
One interpretation of the survey data is that the 
closed shop mayjead to lower levels of union activity 
and poorer levels of service to union members. For 
example, according to the survey, the workplaces 
with the highest number of closed shops and the 
highest level of payroll deduction of union dues also 
had relatively inactive workplace unions. General 
union meetings were conducted irregularly or not at 
all. Little time was spent by union delegates on 
union activities at these workplaces relative to the 
others. Industrial action was commonly of a non­
strike nature, and bargaining, when it did occur, was 
sporadic and reactive.
Another measure of militancy which can be 
used to explore this proposition is strike patterns. If 
the closed shop leads to less militant unions, we 
would expect that workplaces, industries or regions 
with a greater prevalence of closed shops also display 
lower strike frequencies than those without closed 
shops. Recent research in the US found that strikes 
were more severe and probably in states where 
closed shops are outlawed. This is consistent with 
the proposition that unions without a closed shop 
are inclined to strike more, first, because they are less
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‘Are un­
willing 
conscripts 
more apa- 
thetic and 
conserva­
tive than 
volun­
teersV
prone to ‘dilution’ and, second, because they need 
to demonstrate to non-members that they are work­
ing to achieve better wages and conditions.
2. Do closed shops lead to poorer services to 
union members?
This is one of the more popular propositions 
regarding the impact of the closed shop on unions. 
It is pertinent to unions as they look to become 
more service-conscious. The argument is that the 
threat of union members withdrawing their mem­
bership is a necessary condition to ensure unions 
adequately service their membership. With a se­
cure membership resulting from the closed shop, 
union officials may turn their attention to other 
goals which may not be in the short run interests of 
the rank and file. The ability of an employee to 
either willingly join or leave a union provides an 
incentive for the union to ‘earn’ that member 
through the provision of services that they may not 
otherwise receive.
A relevant measure of this proposition is the 
union/non-union wage mark-up. If the proposition 
that the closed shop leads to poorer services for 
union members is correct, we would expect the 
union/non-union wage premium to be higher in 
workplaces, industries or regions where there is no 
closed shop, as unions will strive more effectively to 
make union membership more attractive. In other 
words, unions attempt to ‘sell’ their services by 
raising the union wage rates higher than they oth­
erwise would be. This has been tested empirically in 
the US and studies have found the union wage 
premiums to be higher in states with no closed shops 
than in states where the closed shop is permissible. 
This finding is consistent with our second proposi­
tion that closed shops lead to poorer services to 
union members.
Another US study examined how unions re­
ward their members. The primary aim was to inves­
tigate whether unions in states with no closed shops 
rewarded their members more equally than union is 
other states. The hypothesis was that unions with­
out closed shop provisions would need to take 
greater account of individual members’ interests, 
which would be reflected in union pay growing less 
rapidly with seniority in states with no closed shops, 
as unions need to cater to all members’ interests. 
The conclusion from this study is worth quoting at 
length as it aptly supports the second proposition:
Our results indicate that ‘Right to Work’ legislation 
[closed shop outlawed] affects how unions reward 
members. Unions in ‘Right to Work’ states [no closed 
shop] reward members more currently and more equally 
and are less concerned with day-to-day administration 
of complex bargaining agreements. This is not simply 
because unions must negotiate in a more hostile envi­
ronment in ‘Right to Work’ states... more direct con­
trol over the union by members does that. ‘Right to 
Work’ legislation forces a union to bargain more in the 
immediate interest of all members because members
can withdraw from a union at any time without cost to 
themselves. It is tempting to conclude that ease of 
withdrawal is as beneficial in unionism as it is in 
governments, where costless withdrawal and competi­
tion ensure that government is in the interest of the 
governed rather than the governors.
3. Does the closed shop increase union bar­
gaining power?
This proposition assumes that bargaining power 
relies almost solely on a union’s ability to achieve 
and maintain collective action against an employer. 
The closed shop is seen to assist in this—first, by 
ensuring that union membership will be at a suffi­
ciently critical mass to make collective action effec­
tive; and second, by providing a ‘discipline func­
tion’ over the membership. If collective action is to 
succeed all must be a part. The threat of exclusion 
from the union for recalcitrant members and the 
loss of certain privileges and even their job, is seen 
to strengthen the union’s position in taking strike 
action. Unlike the first hypothesis, strength is seen 
to reside in numbers and in the ability to ensure the 
numbers add up when needed.
A convenient measure of bargaining strength is 
to compare the wages outcomes of workplaces or 
regions which have closed shops with those of 
workplaces or regions without closed shops. Earlier 
evidence in the US suggested that the closed shop 
did increase a union’s bargaining power. Recent 
thinking in the US, however, has cast doubt on the 
validity of these results. Research in Canada has 
also concluded that the presence of a closed shop 
made little difference to a union’s bargaining strength 
as measured by wage outcomes.
In contrast, and perhaps more relevant for Aus­
tralian unions, a number of recent studies in Britain 
lend support to the hypothesis that the closed shop 
does increase unions’ bargaining power. It is, how­
ever, the pre-entry dosed shop (where the union 
controls the labour supply) which appears to have 
most impact in enabling unions to increase wages. 
The post-entry closed shop has a very small to 
negligible impact on pay over and above unionisa­
tion, and may be more a function of high union 
density at the workplace.
Evidence about the impact of the closed shop 
on union bargaining power is them somewhat am­
biguous. On the one hand the US and Canadian 
evidence suggests that the closed shop may not 
increase unions’ bargaining power. On the other 
hand, the British evidence suggests that some forms 
of closed shops, specifically the pre-entry closed 
shop, enables unions to enjoy greater bargaining 
power. Post-entry closed shops add little to union 
bargaining power over that resulting from a high 
level of union density.
4- Does the closed shop lead to increased 
union membership?
If workers are compelled to join a union then 
the ranks of unionists will most likely increase. The
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important assumption here is that this is worth­
while in itself, because it will also increase union 
strength through increased membership and finan­
cial security. This assumption is in contrast to the 
assumption of our first proposition. Does the ban­
ning of the closed shop affect unions’ ability to 
organise?
The evidence from the US suggests that, while 
the presence of a closed shop does not seem to have 
a great impact in the long run. One study revealed 
that the number of union members was 5% lower 
than it would otherwise have been a decade after a 
state had passed anti-closed shop legislation. The 
worrying result from a union perspective was that 
the level of unionism was permanently reduced 
after the closed shop was banned.
In New Zealand a post-entry closed shop has 
been the norm in most workplaces since 1936. This 
form of compulsory unionism had a positive effect 
on aggregate union membership growth. In 1984 
closed shop provisions were abolished; they were 
subsequently reintroduced by a Labour government 
in 1985; and were again recently revoked in the 
dramatic changes to New Zealand’s industrial rela­
tions system. The impact on union membership of 
the first removal of closed shop provisions was 
considerable. Interestingly, the smaller unions fared 
much better than the large unions and in some cases 
even gained members. This may indicate that smaller 
unions are more effective in providing services to 
their members and may caution against the assump­
tion that union amalgamations and the deregistration 
of small unions will necessarily strengthen the bar­
gaining powers of unions.
In Australia, the positive effect of preference 
clauses and closed shop provisions in assisting some 
unions increase their membership since the 1970s 
has been well documented. The impact of some 
preference clauses on union membership seems to 
have been substantial—as in the cases of the growth 
of the Clerks and Retail trades unions, and the rapid 
growth in unionisation in the early 1970s in the 
ACT and the Northern Territory. This tide was 
turned in the early 1980s due to conservative gov­
ernment attacks on these provisions. Union growth 
in Queensland and Western Australia suffered for 
similar reasons due to legislation against compul­
sory unionism.
It is clear that the closed shop does assist unions 
in maintaining higher levels and growth in union 
membership. The proposition that unions can jus­
tify striving for the closed shop for this reason alone, 
however, may be tenuous. If union strength and 
bargaining power rests primarily in the size of mem­
bership, the closed shop may be worthwhile for 
unions. However, it is far from clear that this is in 
fact the case.
It is probably not possible to provide definitive 
answers to the question of what impact the closed 
shop has on unions. My purpose here is simply to
question the implicit acceptance of the closed shop 
and to challenge the view that the closed shop is 
vital for union survival. Indeed, it may be suggested 
that the removal of the closed shop would be in the 
union movement’s long-term interest.
The closed shop may lead to reduced union 
militancy and activity and lower and poorer serv­
ices to union members, and may not necessarily 
lead to increased bargaining power. The exception 
in the latter case seems to be the pre-entry closed 
shop. This form of closed shop is not a widespread 
phenomenon in most countries and seems unlikely 
to grow in the near future. Union-operated employ­
ment agencies could be one option to be explored. 
The one area where the closed shop seems to have 
a definite positive impact from a union perspective 
is in sustaining higher levels of union membership 
than would otherwise be the case. If union strength 
and militancy is not only a function of numbers, 
however, then this may be a pyrrhic victory in the 
long run.
Should unions strive and channel their energies 
into establishing and supporting closed shops or 
concentrate on improving services and organisa­
tional effectiveness in order to attract members 
voluntarily? The latter would seem the more sensi­
ble option. Certain cautionary remarks are, how­
ever, in order. First, the nature of certain industries 
and occupations makes voluntary recruitment diffi­
cult, and a closed shop may be the only viable 
option. For instance, it was in industries subject to 
casualisation and high turnover rates such as 
stevedoring and construction that the closed shop 
originally arose. Second, there is the ‘free-rider’ 
problem. Is it right for all workers to enjoy the fruits 
of a few without contributing to this effort ?This will 
no doubt remain the battle cry of most union 
activists. However, it may well be that a few free­
riders are worth having in exchange for a more 
committed and better serviced membership in the 
long run. Third, and perhaps most importantly, 
none of this addresses the question of union ideol­
ogy. It may be that a militant union will not be 
adversely affected by the closed shop because of 
other union goals and policies. On the other hand, 
the closed shop may exacerbate the negative ten­
dencies discussed above in a moderate or conserva­
tive union. Unions of all persuasions, however, 
need to consider seriously how useful it is to base 
their activities on an apathetic or even hostile 
membership. ■
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‘After the 
closed shop 
was re­
moved some 
smaller 
unions even 
gained 
members’
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